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Our knowledge of the very narrow limits of human rationality must
dispose us to doubt that business firms, investors or consumers
possess either the knowledge or computational ability that would
be required to carry out the rational expectations strategy.
Herbert Simon (1969)

The claim that the market can be trusted to correct the effect of
individual irrationalities cannot be made without supporting
evidence, and the burden of specifying a plausible corrective
mechanism should rest on those who make this claim.
Tversky and Kahneman (1986).

The principal findings of experimental economics are that
impersonal exchange in markets converges in repeated interaction
to the equilibrium states implied by economic theory, under
information conditions far weaker than specified in the theory.
Vernon Smith (2008)

I. INTRODUCTION
A central feature of economic theory is derivation of equilibrium in
economies populated by agents who optimize some well-ordered function such as
profit or utility. Although it is recognized that actions of economic agents are
subject to institutional constraints and feedback (D. North, 1990), exploration of
the extent to which equilibrium arises from characteristics of the institutional
environment, as opposed to the behavior of individuals, has been limited;
Becker’s (1962) derivation of downward slope of demand functions is a notable
exception. The normal modeling technique is to ascribe sophisticated
computational abilities to a representative agent to solve for equilibrium (J. F.
Muth, 1961). Plott and Sunder (1982, henceforth PS) have shown that markets
with uncertainty and asymmetrically distributed information (with two or three
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states of the world) disseminate information and converge near rational
expectations equilibria when populated with profit-motivated human traders. The
present paper asks if the PS results can also be achieved by minimally intelligent
traders (Gode and Sunder 1993) using the means-end heuristic, and reports an
affirmative answer.
Simon (1969 Chapter 3) questioned the plausibility of human agents, with
their limited cognitive abilities, forming rational expectations by intuition.
Accumulated observational evidence on these cognitive limits of individuals
shifted the burden of proof, and led to calls for evidence that markets can
overcome such behavioral limitations (R. H. Thaler, 1986, A. Tversky and D.
Kahneman, 1986).
Laboratory studies of markets populated by asymmetrically-informed
profit-motivated human subjects reveal that their aggregate level outcomes tend to
converge near the predictions of rational expectations theory (R. Forsythe and R.
Lundholm, 1990, R. Forsythe et al., 1982, C. R. Plott and S. Sunder, 1982, 1988).
However, since complex patterns of human behavior can only be inferred, not
observed directly, it is difficult to know from human experiments which elements
of trader behavior and faculties are necessary or sufficient for various markets to
attain their theoretical equilibria1. This difficulty has led to claims that inability of
human beings to optimize by intuition implies that economic theories based on
optimization assumptions are prima facie invalid (for example, Tversky and
Kahneman (1986)).
Such doubts about the achievability of mathematically derived equilibria,
when individual agents are not able to perform complex optimization calculations,
are understandable. From a constructivist point of view (V. L. Smith, 2008),

1

See for example Dickhaut, Lin, Porter & Smith (2012) regarding conditions where markets with
human traders are less likely to conform to predicted equilibria.
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rational expectations equilibria place heavy demands on individual cognition to
learn others’ preferences or strategies, and to arrive at unbiased estimates of
underlying parameters of the economy by observing markets. In theory,
disseminating and detecting information in markets calls for bootstrapping—
rational assessments are necessary to arrive in equilibrium and such assessments
require observation of equilibrium outcomes. Cognitive and computational
demands on individuals to arrive at economic equilibria, especially rationalexpectations equilibria, are high, raising doubts about the plausibility of
equilibrium models (H. A. Simon, 1969).
Replacing humans by algorithms allows us to examine whether the use of
certain simple heuristics by individual traders is sufficient for attaining rational
expectations equilibria (as a proof of concept). Without claiming that human
traders actually use such heuristics, it is possible and useful to determine if
heuristics making low computation demands on human reasoning might be
sufficient for attaining equilibria in a given market environment. Combining
Newell and Simon’s (1972) means-end heuristic with Gode and Sunder’s (1993,
1997) zero-intelligence (ZI) approach, we find and report that markets with
uncertainty and asymmetric information attain outcomes approximating rational
expectations equilibria, even when they are populated by simple minimallyintelligent adaptive algorithmic traders. Since the statistical distribution of these
outcomes is centered near the PS observations of markets with human traders, the
convergence of their outcomes to equilibrium can be attributed to the combination
of the market structure and the minimal levels of intelligence and adaptive ability
built into the trading algorithms. Since these trader faculties are far less
demanding than what is assumed in deriving the equilibria, and certainly within
known human capabilities, we infer that the convergence of markets to rational
expectations equilibria emerge mainly from the properties of the market and
simple and plausible decision heuristics, rather than from complex and
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sophisticated optimization (Gary Becker, 1962, Gode and Sunder, 1993, Gerd
Gigerenzer and P. Todd, 1999, V. L. Smith, 2008).

II. BACKGROUND AND THEORY
Instead of assuming sophisticated information processing capabilities and
maximization objectives of agents, we can think of market structure constraining
human behavior to guide their aggregate level outcomes to the neighborhood of
theoretical equilibria. Becker (1962) showed that the downward slope of demand
functions arises from individuals having to act within their budget constraints,
even if they choose randomly from their opportunity sets. Smith (1962) reported
that classroom double auction markets populated by a mere handful of profitmotivated student traders with minimal information arrive in close proximity of
Walrasian equilibrium. Moreover, Smith’s auction markets had little resemblance
to the tâtonnement story often used to motivate theoretical derivations of
equilibria.
Gode and Sunder (1993) combined Becker’s constrained random choice
with Smith’s double auctions and reported the results of computer simulations of
simple double auctions populated by “zero intelligence” (henceforth ZI)
algorithmic traders who bid or ask randomly within their budget constraints (i.e.,
buyers do not bid above their private values and sellers do not ask below their
private costs). Although these traders do not remember, optimize, maximize
profits, or learn, simulated markets populated by such traders also reach the
proximity of their theoretical equilibria, especially in their allocative efficiency. In
simple double auctions without uncertainty or information asymmetry, theoretical
equilibria are attainable with individuals endowed with only minimal levels of
intelligence (not trading at a loss). Jamal and Sunder (1996) extended the results
to markets with shared uncertainty with algorithmic agents using means-end
heuristic (henceforth M-E,) developed by Newell and Simon (1972).
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Substitution of human subjects used in traditional laboratory markets by
algorithmic agents using M-E heuristic has the advantage of helping us gain
precise control of traders’ information processing and decision making (i.e.,
“cognitive”) abilities. Holding trader “cognition” constant at a specified level
allows us to explore the properties of outcomes of market structures and
environment (also, see Angerer et al. (2010); and Huber et al. (2010)). In contrast,
we can neither observe nor hold invariant the strategies used by human traders.
The use of algorithmic traders enables us to run longer computational
experiments, randomize parameters in the experimental setting, and conduct
replications without significantly more time or money.
The paper is organized in four sections. The second section describes a
simple M-E heuristic used by minimally-intelligent algorithmic traders in a
double auction market. In the third section, we implement this heuristic in a
market where some traders have perfect insider information (while others have no
information) and compare the simulation results with the data from the profitmotivated human experiments reported by PS. The fourth section presents
implications of the findings and some concluding remarks.
III. MEANS-END HEURISTIC
Simon (1955) proposed bounded rationality as a process model to
understand and explain how humans, with their limited knowledge and
computational capacity behave in complex settings. He postulated that humans
develop and use simple heuristics to seek and attain merely satisfactory, not
optimal, outcomes. To understand human problem-solving Newell and Simon
(1972) developed General Problem Solver (GPS). They adduced a large body of
data which show that GPS is a robust model of human problem-solving in a wide
variety of tasks and environments. The key heuristic used by GPS is means-ends
analysis (M-E or the heuristic of reducing differences). Gigerenzer et al. (1999)
have focused on the usefulness and effectiveness of fast and frugal heuristics like
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M-E in human life, whereas Tversky and Kahneman (1974) have documented a
similar heuristic which they labeled anchor-and-adjust.
GPS recognizes knowledge states, differences between knowledge states,
operators, goals, sub-goals and problem solving heuristics as entities. GPS starts
with an initial (or current) knowledge state, and a goal or desired knowledge state.
GPS then selects and applies operators that reduce the difference between the
current state and the goal state. The M-E heuristic for carrying out this procedure
can be summarized in four steps: (i) compare the current knowledge state a with a
goal state b to identify difference d between them; (ii) find an operator o that will
reduce the difference d in the next step; (iii) apply the operator o to the current
knowledge state a to produce a new current knowledge state a’ that is closer to b
than a; and (iv) repeat this process until the current knowledge state a’ is
acceptably close to the goal state b. Knowledge states of traders can be
represented as aspiration levels that adjust in response to experience (H. A.
Simon, 1956). The M-E heuristic for a trader thus requires a mechanism for
setting an initial aspiration level, and a method for adjusting these levels in light
of experience (e.g., Jamal and Sunder (1996)).
A. Market Environment
Markets examined here are defined by four elements: (i) uncertainty, (ii)
distribution of information, (iii) security payoffs, and (iv) rules of the market.
Following PS we examine markets for securities with either two (X and Y) or
three (X, Y, and Z) states of the world, where each state Si occurs with a known
probability πi. One half of the traders in the markets (n=6) are informed about the
realized state before trading starts each period, while the other half (n=6) are
uninformed. At the beginning of each period, each trader of type j (j=3 types in
our experiment) is endowed with two units of a security which pays a single statecontingent dividend DSj at the end of the trading period. There are no cash
constraints. There are three types of traders and each trader type gets a different
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dividend in a given state. The rules of the double auction are as follows: after a
bid or ask is generated (see section 2.3 for details on algorithm for generating bids
and asks), the highest bid price is compared to the lowest ask price. If the bid
price is equal to or greater than the ask price a trade occurs. The recorded
transaction price is set to be equal to the midpoint between the bid and ask prices.
B. Implementing the M-E Heuristic2
In the first of the two implementation steps, each agent’s initial knowledge
state (aspiration level) is set equal to the expected value of the payoff based on its
private information. The second step implements the idea that subjects without
perfect information make gradual adjustments by applying weight γ (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1) to
newest observed price Pt, and weight (1- γ ) to their Current Aspiration Level
(CALt). This process can be represented as a first-order adaptive process:
CALt+1 = (1 - γ) CALt + γ Pt.

(1)

If CAL0 is the initial value of CALt, by substitution,
CALt+1 = (1 - γ)t+1 CAL0 + γ ((1 - γ)tP1 + (1 - γ)t-1 P2 + … + (1 - γ) Pt-1 + Pt).
(2)
In the context of markets organized as double auctions (where both buyers
and sellers can actively propose prices to transact at), these two elements of the
M-E heuristic—setting an initial aspiration level and gradually adapting it in light
of observed transaction prices constitute the entire heuristic activity of the agent3.
Minimally Intelligent Algorithmic Agents
Algorithmic agents use their “current aspiration level” (CAL) to
implement a ZI strategy after Gode and Sunder (1993); they bid randomly chosen
2

A flow chart and an outline code of the heuristic are available at http://www.zitraders.com,
Previous attempts to model individual human behavior has used processes very similar to
equation 2 (Carlson, J. A. and T. B. Okeefe. 1969. "Buffer Stocks and Reaction Coefficients Experiment with Decision Making under Risk." Review of Economic Studies, 36(4), 467-84,
Carlson, John. 1967. "The Stability of an Experimental Market with a Supply-Response Lag."
Southern Economic Journal, 33(3), 305-21.
3
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prices below and ask randomly chosen prices above their aspiration levels.
Traders draw a uniformly distributed random number between 0 and an upper
limit of 1. If the number drawn is less than or equal to 0.5, the trader generates a
bid; if the number drawn is greater than 0.5, it generates an ask. The bid amount
is determined by drawing a second random number between a lower bound of 0
and an upper bound of the individual trader’s CAL. If this bid exceeds the current
high bid, it becomes the new high bid. Correspondingly, if the action is an ask, its
amount is determined by generating a second random number in the range
between the lower bound of the traders CAL and the upper bound of 1. This
newly generated ask becomes the new current low ask if it is less than the existing
current low ask. These random draws from uniform distributions are generated
independently. The algorithmic agents are myopic, making no attempt to
anticipate, backward induct, or theorize about the behavior of other traders. They
simply use the knowledge of observable past market events (transaction prices) to
estimate their opportunity sets, and choose randomly from these sets.
These markets are populated in equal numbers by traders of each payoff
type of whom 50% are (and 50% are not) informed about the realized state of
world. The informed algorithmic traders begin by setting their initial CAL using
the perfect signal they have about the realized state of the world for any given
trader type j4:
If realized state = X, CALX= DXj
If realized state = Y, CALY = DYj

(3)

The uninformed traders of type j use their unconditional expected
dividend value to set their initial CAL using the prior state probabilities5:
CALj = Pr(X) * (DXj) + Pr(Y) * (DYj)
4
5

For 3-state markets, if realized state = Z, CALY = DZj.
For 3-state markets, CALj = Pr(X)*(DXj) +Pr(Y)*(DYj)+Pr(X)*(DZj).

9

(4)

Since they know the state with certainty, informed traders do not update
their CALs in response to observed transactions; they learn nothing about the state
of the world from transaction prices.6 Uninformed traders of every dividend type,
however, update their CALs after each transaction using the M-E heuristic (i.e.,
first-order adaptive process) given in [1] above.
CAL updating is done with a randomly chosen value of the adaptive
parameter  for the simulation (see the Experimental Design below). Submission
of bids and asks continues with the updated CALs serving as constraints on the
opportunity sets of traders until the next transaction occurs, and this process is
repeated for 5,000 cycles to the end of the period. At the end of each period the
realized state is revealed to all traders, dividends are paid to their accounts, and
each trader’s security endowment is refreshed for the following period. The
uninformed algorithmic traders carry their end-of-period CAL forward and use it
as the starting point in the following period.7 Since our traders have minimal
intelligence, they do not learn by observing other’s behavior or make
generalizations across markets. They act in a myopic way at all times to help
examine the sufficiency of using such a strategy for attaining economic equilibria.
In the following period, informed traders again get a perfect signal about
the state and set their CAL = DXj (or DYj ) depending on whether the signal
received is X or Y (or Z in 3-state markets). The uninformed traders use their end6

The informed traders could, for example, learn that in some states market prices are higher than
their own dividend in that state, and thus raise their CAL to that higher level. Human traders,
presumably, make this adjustment but our algorithmic traders are not allowed to make such
adjustments. We should not, therefore, expect the markets with these minimally-intelligent agents
to behave identically to the human markets.
7
It would have been possible for the agents to keep track of the prices associated with each
realized state and use this information in subsequent periods. In the spirit of minimal intelligence,
our agents do not do so, and uninformed agents simply carry forward their CAL from the end of
one period to the beginning of the next period. The CAL of informed agents responds to a perfect
signal about the state realized in each period and is not dependent on experience in previous
periods.
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of-period CAL from the preceding period as CAL0 to trade and to generate CAL1
after the first transaction, and so on.
C. Experimental Design
We use the market design parameters from the PS’s (1982) human
experiments for the present simulations (see Table 1). We ran 50 replications of
four markets numbered 2, 3, 4 and 5 as reported by PS’s (1982) human
experiments (three states in Market 5, and two in the other three markets).8 The
participants were freshly endowed with two securities every period and have no
cash constraint. For each of the 50 replications, the adjustment parameter γ was
randomly and independently drawn from a uniform distribution U(0.05, 0.15)9. In
each market, there are 12 traders who traded single period securities. A random
state of nature—X, Y, (or Z in case of 3-states)—was drawn at the start of each
period to match the actual realizations observed in the PS’s markets. Except for a
few initial periods (when no trader was informed), and in some final periods
(when all traders were informed), six of these twelve traders had perfect inside
information and the other six were uninformed. For consistency and ease of
reference, we identify these markets using the same numbers as used by PS.10

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here.

8

Plott and Sunder (1982) found that the information structure of their Market 1 was too complex
for it to reach rational expectations equilibrium in less than a dozen periods. Accordingly, we have
not tried to replicate that information structure and market in the present simulations.
9
These ranges have been used in previous market simulation studies (Gode and Sunder 1993,
1997; Jamal and Sunder 1996) and have no normative content per se.
10
In this paper we only report periods where six traders in the market are informed and the other
six are uninformed. We have also simulated periods where all traders were informed, or all were
uninformed. The results are not qualitatively different from human participants reported in PS.
Full simulation results, including all periods with informed/uninformed traders are available at
http://www.zitraders.com. This website also gives an outline of the code, and allows visitors to see
the charts of market outcomes.
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. MARKETS WITH ASYMMETRIC INSIDER INFORMATION
Figure 1 shows the time chart of prices observed in five asymmetric
information periods of a market populated with profit-motivated human traders
(heavy blue curve) reported in PS against the background of two theoretical (RE solid green horizontal line) and Walrasian (PI – dashed brown horizontal line)
predictions for respective periods . The red curve in medium thickness plots the
median of prices from 50 replications (shown as a cloud) of the same market with
M-E heuristic algorithmic traders. The adaptive parameter γ is randomly and
independently drawn each period from a uniform distribution U(0.05, 0.15) and is
identical across all traders. Six of the twelve traders have perfect inside
information and the other six are uninformed. Allocative efficiency and trading
volume are shown numerically for each period in Table 2.
Figure 1 indicates: (i) In state X (with low RE price of 0.24 in periods 7
and 9), transaction prices of both human traders (blue curve) and algorithmic
traders (red curve) approach the RE equilibrium level from above. (ii) In state Y
(with higher RE price of 0.35 in periods 10 and 11), transaction prices of both
human traders and algorithmic traders generally approach and get close to the
equilibrium level from below. (iii) As shown in Table 2 for Market 2, in State X
(low RE price) periods, average trading volume for human traders across the two
periods is 19.5 while the average volume for algorithmic traders is 17.5. The
allocative efficiency of human trader markets across the two X periods is 63.5%,
while efficiency of the simulated markets is 80.3%. Note that allocative efficiency
arises from having the appropriate number of securities being acquired by the
appropriate type of traders as specified by rational expectations equilibrium.
Efficiency levels (below 100%) arise when the wrong type of traders are holding
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some of the securities. In State Y (high RE price) periods, human traders’ average
volume is 19.3 (vs. 23.7 for algorithmic traders) and human trader efficiency is
100%, while algorithmic traders achieve efficiency levels of 98.7%. The
direction and volume of trading is close to the predictions of RE equilibrium.
There are also important differences between the convergence paths for
human and simulated markets: convergence of prices to RE predictions with
human traders is tighter and progressively faster in later periods; algorithmic
simulations exhibit little change from early to later realizations of the same state
(X or Y). Efficiency results also show human subjects improving over time (when
State is X), whereas markets populated with algorithmic traders show less
improvement over time.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Figure 1 and Table 2 about Here
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Replication of the additional 2-state markets (Markets 3 and 4) with
different parameters (see Figures 2 and 3 and the two middle sections of Table 2)
show essentially the same pattern of convergence except that in State Y (with low
RE price) human traders have a tendency to converge quickly to the RE price,
especially in later periods (not coming from above or below) whereas the paths
with algorithmic traders depend on history in the previous period (because the
CAL of the uninformed traders is carried forward from previous periods). If the
previous period is State X (high RE price) the simulation converges from above; if
the previous period is State Y (low RE price), the simulation converges from
below the RE price. As expected, algorithmic traders adjust slowly and learn
myopically without any global awareness of equilibrium prices.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Figures 2 and 3
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Figure 4 displays data for a three-state market reported by PS with human
traders, and an identical market replicated for this paper with algorithmic traders.
The solid green horizontal line indicates the rational expectations (dashed brown
line for PI) equilibrium price for the respective periods. Allocative efficiency and
trading volume for Market V are shown numerically for each period in the bottom
section of Table 2.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Figure 4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 4 indicates: (i) In state Z (with high RE price of 0.32), for both
human (blue line) and algorithmic traders (red line) transaction prices approach
and get close to the RE equilibrium level from below. (ii) In state Y (with RE
price of 0.245 in the middle of the other two states), transaction prices also
generally approach and get close to the equilibrium level from below in both
human and simulated markets. (iii) In state X transaction prices generally
approach from below, the only exception occurs in Period 11 when the market
converges from above in both human and simulated markets. It appears that
moving from a high equilibrium price state to a lower price state may cause
convergences from above. Otherwise, both humans and our simulated traders
tend to approach the equilibrium price from below. (iv) Trading volume in all
three states is generally greater than the predicted volume of 16 trades. For human
traders volume tends to range from 15-23 trades, whereas algorithmic traders
volume ranges from 14-24 trades. (v) In all periods of State Z (high RE price),
allocative efficiency for human traders is 100% whereas algorithmic traders
achieve 98.8% efficiency. In State Y (middle RE price) periods, allocative
efficiency of human traders averages 96.8% (100% efficiency in all periods
except the first realization of State Y) whereas algorithmic traders achieve 95.4%
efficiency and do not achieve 100% efficiency in any individual period. In State X
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(low RE price) periods, allocative efficiency of human traders averages 87.7%
whereas algorithmic traders achieve 91.5% efficiency. Table 2 shows volume
and efficiency numerically. Again, it is clear that, outcomes of markets with
profit-motivated human and minimally intelligent algorithmic traders exhibit the
same central tendencies of convergence towards the predictions of rational
expectations models. Apparently, the structural constraints of the market rules,
and Newell and Simon’s (1972) simple means-end heuristics are sufficient to
yield this result even as the number of states in the market increases from 2 states
to 3.
B. PRICE CHANGES, VOLUME AND EFFICIENCY
To assess price convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium, we
report results of a procedure used by Gode and Sunder (1993) who regressed the
root mean squared deviation between transaction and RE equilibrium prices on
the natural logarithm of the transaction sequence number within a period. If prices
move towards RE levels over time, the slope coefficient of this regression should
be less than zero. Four panels of Figure 5 show the behavior of this root mean
square deviation over time for the four human and simulated market pairs. Results
of ordinary least squares regressions of MSD on log of transaction sequence
number in human and simulated markets are shown in two triplets in each panel
(slope, p-value, and R2)11 respectively. Three of the four human (with the
exception of Market II), as well as all four simulated markets exhibit significant
convergence to RE equilibrium, and the zero-slope hypothesis is rejected in favor
of negative slope alternative at p < 0.000 for the seven of the eight (human and
simulated) markets. About 80% of the reduction in the deviation from RE
equilibria being explained by log of transaction sequence number. Figure 5 shows
11

We report results using the same format as Plott and Sunder (1982) so our
simulation results can be compared with the human experiment results.
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that root mean squared deviation of transaction from RE equilibrium prices tends
towards 0.
Across all 32 periods of the four markets, the difference between the
trading volume and efficiency (Table 2, charted in Figures 6 and 7) of human and
simulated markets is not statistically different (average volume of simulated
market is about one trade greater than for human markets with t-statistic of 1.35
and the average efficiency of simulated markets is 1.6% lower than that of
markets with human traders (t-statistic of -1.08). There is no significant difference
between the volumes and efficiency of markets with human traders as opposed to
algorithmic traders. The inference is not that these simple algorithms capture all
or even most of the behavior of the humans; that is not true. However, when seen
through the perspective of aggregate market outcomes—prices, allocations,
trading volume, and efficiency—in their central tendency, these simple heuristics
appear to be sufficient to explain the human subject convergence to RE equilibria
in these markets.

C. MINIMUM INFORMATION CONDITIONS
We altered the simulation to conduct a sensitivity analysis to see what
would happen when the market is populated with the minimum number of
informed traders for markets 2, 3 and 412. In each market this means that we
provide information to only one type of trader. Since there are three types of
traders in each market the minimum number of informed traders is three13. All of
the remaining parameters were identical to other simulations. We ran the
simulation series twice, once with 5,000 iterations and a second time with 10,000
iterations. This was done to see if the number of iterations was a limiting factor.

12
13

Due to the structure of Market 5 we are not able to decrease the number of informed traders.
One for each type.
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Table 3 provides the results of the sensitivity analysis.
For the 5,000 iteration simulation runs, efficiency levels reported in Table
3 range from 80% to 88% whereas the comparable efficiency levels with 6
informed traders in Table 2 range from 89.5% to 95%. The average efficiency
levels drop by about 7% when the number of informed traders of each type is
reduced from 2 to 1. Increasing the number of iterations to 10,000 as reported in
Table 3 yields an efficiency range of 82% to 89%; there is not much improvement
obtained by increasing the length of time available to trade.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 3 about Here
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------We also conducted a simulation in which we increased the number of each
type of informed trader to three (for a total of nine informed traders out of a total
of twelve traders).

Efficiency levels with 9 informed traders range from 89.5%

to 94% which is essentially the same as the range obtained with 6 informed
traders (compared with range 89.5-95% in Table 2)14. These results suggest that
the presence of even very few informed traders (one of each type in our case) may
be sufficient for the market to approach rational expectations equilibria.
Additional increases in the number of informed traders (from 1 informed trader of
each type to 2) improves market performance a bit; however, gains from
increasing the number of informed traders flattens out quickly and there is little
further improvement from increasing the number of informed traders of each type
from 2 to 3.
We note that in the high equilibrium price state (Y in Market 2 and X in
Markets 3 and 4; see Table 1), each market achieves close to 100% efficiency

14

Table 4 for the results with 9 out of 12 informed traders is available at
http://www.zitraders.com/.
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both for human traders and algorithmic traders (with 3, 6 or 9 insiders – see
Figure 8). We conjecture that in the high price state, informed traders are buyers
who have no budget constraint so they can keep bidding up the price until all
feasible trades have occurred. In the low equilibrium price state, both human and
algorithmic traders have lower efficiency levels, generally close to 80% on
average see Figure 8). We conjecture that these lower efficiency levels occur due
to the restriction on short-selling in our simulations, particularly in the low-priced
state when the informed traders are sellers rather than buyers. Since there are
only three informed traders in each market, this means that there are a total of six
tokens held by informed traders. Once the informed traders have sold all their
tokens, there are generally no further trades available since the CALs of the
uninformed traders are usually higher than the prior trade price and the informed
traders cannot take advantage of this price discrepancy and drive the market price
towards the RE equilibrium.

V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have presented evidence that individual behavior, modeled by simple
means-end heuristics and minimal-intelligence, is sufficient to yield market-level
outcomes centered around the equilibrium levels derived from strong assumptions
about optimization by individual agents. This occurs even though our algorithmic
traders lack any learning capacity and thus are unable to make even simple
inferences from previous experience to improve their current and future
performance. This lack of learning preserves the spirit of Zero Intelligence (ZI)
models of behavior (Gode and Sunder 1993), and makes it more difficult for our
algorithmic traders to achieve the high levels of economic efficiency (and
learning across periods) exhibited by human subjects in experiments.
Even if this key optimization assumption of theory were descriptively
invalid, it does not necessarily undermine the validity and predictive value of the
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theory at the aggregate level. Our findings are consistent with Gigerenzer et al.
(1999) who built on Simon’s bounded rationality paradigm by proposing that
individuals use “fast and frugal” heuristics to successfully accomplish complex
tasks.
The computational or other “cognitive” abilities of our algorithmic traders
do not exceed, indeed are far weaker than, the documented faculties of human
cognition. Yet, these simulated markets with insider trading based on asymmetric
access to information converge to the close proximity of rational expectations
equilibria and attain high allocative efficiency. Contrary to claims made in
behavioral economics literature (R. H. Thaler, 1986, A. Tversky and D.
Kahneman, 1974), we find that individuals using a simple means-end heuristic
(analogous to Tversky and Kahneman’s 1974 anchor–and-adjust heuristic) in a
market setting generate outcomes close to the rational expectations equilibrium.
We interpret the results to suggest that, even in these relatively more complex
market environments (as compared to Gode and Sunder (1993, 1997) and Jamal
and Sunder (1996)), allocative efficiency of markets remains largely a function of
their structure, not intelligence or optimizing behavior of agents. Attention to
understanding the role of market structure, not just human cognition, may help
advance our understanding of links between economic theory and market
outcomes.
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Table 1
Simulation Parametersa

Market Corresponding Market State Probability

Dividends For Each Trader Type
Type I

Type II

Type III

RE Predictions
Price
(Allocation to)*

PI Predictions
Price
(Allocation to)*

2 Plott and Sunder 1982
Market 2

X
Y

0.333
0.667

0.1
0.35

0.2
0.3

0.24
0.175

0.24(III)
0.35(I)

0.266(Iu)
0.35(Ii)

3 Plott and Sunder 1982
Market 3

X
Y

0.4
0.6

0.4
0.1

0.3
0.15

0.125
0.175

0.4(I)
0.175(III)

0.4(Ii)
0.22(Iu)

4 Plott and Sunder 1982
Market 4

X
Y

0.4
0.6

0.375
0.1

0.275
0.15

0.1
0.175

0.375(I)
0.175(III)

0.375(Ii)
0.21(Iu)

5 Plott and Sunder 1982
Market 5

X
Y
Z

0.35
0.25
0.4

0.12
0.17
0.32

0.155
0.245
0.135

0.18
0.1
0.16

0.18(III)
0.245(II)
0.32(I)

0.212(Iu)
0.245(IIi)
0.32(Ii)

a

Plott and Sunder (1982) conducted an experiment with profit oriented human traders (half informed about the state, and half
uninformed) to ascertain whether they traded at prices (and quantities) predicted by rational expectations models. Table 1 shows
the parameters used in the experiment and the predictions about price and which trader type should hold securities in these
markets. Our simulation uses the same parameters as those used in the PS experiment. Traders have two tokens each available for
trade, and no cash constraints.
*Allocation code: I, II, and III for all traders of types I, II, and III respectively. I i for informed traders of type I, Iu for uninformed
traders of type I, and similarly for informed and uninformed traders of types II and III.
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Table 2:
Number of Transactions (Efficiency Levels in Percentages) with six informed traders by Market and Periodb
Market 2
Period
(State)
Human Data
Simulation
(Average of
50 Reps)
Market 3
Period
(State)
Human Data
Simulation
(Average of
50 Reps)
Market 4
Period
(State)
Human Data
Simulation
(Average of
50 Reps)
Market 5
Period
(State)

7(X)

8(Y)

9(X)

10(Y)

11(Y)

Avg.(X)

Avg.(Y)

Avg.
(All)

Trans
(Eff)

22
(57)

19
(100)

17
(70)

19
(100)

20
(100)

19.5
(63.5)

19.3
(100)

19.4
(85.4)

Trans
(Eff)

19
(78)

25
(99)

16
(83)

25
(99)

21
(98)

17.5
(80.3)

23.7
(98.7)

21.2
(91.4)

3(Y)

4(X)

5(Y)

6(Y)

7(X)

8(Y)

9(X)

10(Y)

Avg.(X)

Avg.(Y)

Avg.
(All)

Trans
(Eff)

15
(79)

19
(100)

15
(88)

14
(89)

19
(100)

14
(98)

15
(100)

15
(99)

17.7
(100)

14.6
(90.6)

15.8
(94.1)

Trans
(Eff)

14
(87)

25
(100)

12
(81)

14
(87)

25
(100)

12
(81)

25
(100)

12
(80)

25.0
(100)

12.8
(83.3)

17.4
(89.5)

5(Y)

6(X)

7(Y)

8(Y)

9(X)

10(Y)

11(X)

12(Y)

13(X)

Avg.(X)

Avg.(Y)

Avg.
(All)

Trans
(Eff)

17
(92)

23
(100)

17
(95)

12
(93)

20
(100)

14
(94)

21
(100)

18
(94)

21
(100)

21.3
(100)

15.6
(93.6)

18.1
(96.4)

Trans
(Eff)

14
(90)

25
(100)

12
(81)

14
(88)

25
(100)

12
(80)

24
(100)

12
(81)

24
(100)

24.5
(100)

12.8
(83.9)

18.0
(94.1)

4(X)

5(X)

6(Y)

7(Z)

8(Z)

9(Y)

10(Y)

11(X)

12(Y)

13(Z)

Avg.(X)

Avg.(Y)

Avg. (Z)

Avg.
(All)

Human Data

Trans
(Eff)

15
(82)

16
(94)

17
(87)

20
(100)

23
(100)

21
(100)

20
(100)

18
(87)

18
(100)

16
(100)

16.3
(87.7)

19.0
(96.8)

19.7
(100)

18.4
(95)

Simulation
(Average of
50 Reps)

Trans
(Eff)

14
(93)

16
(95)

22
(99)

23
(99)

24
(98)

16
(87)

21
(97)

13
(87)

22
(99)

23
(99)

14.3
(91.5)

20.3
(95.4)

23.3
(98.8)

19.4
(95.3)

b

Plott and Sunder (1982) conducted an experiment with profit oriented human traders to ascertain whether they traded at prices (and
quantities) predicted by rational expectations models. Table 2 shows the number of transactions and efficiency levels attained by human
traders, as well as simulated algorithmic traders who use a simple linear heuristic to update aspiration levels. The number of transactions
and efficiency of markets with simulated and human traders are qualitatively comparable across state realizations in the four markets.
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Table 3:
Number of Transactions (Efficiency Levels in Percentages) by Market and Period for Replications with only three informed traders b
Market 2
Period
(State)
5000
Iterations
(Average of
50 Reps)
10000
Iterations
(Average of
50 Reps)
Market 3
Period
(State)
5000
Iterations
(Average of
50 Reps)
10000
Iterations
(Average of
50 Reps)
Market 4
Period
(State)
5000
Iterations
(Average of
50 Reps)
10000
Iterations
(Average of
50 Reps)

Trans
(Eff)

7(X)

8(Y)

9(X)

10(Y)

11(Y)

Avg.(X)

Avg.(Y)

Avg.
(All)

19
(46)

23
(97)

8
(71)

20
(95)

15
(91)

13.4
(58.5)

19.1
(94.3)

17.0
(80.0)

Avg. 6
Inf.
Traders

21.2
(91.4)
Trans
(Eff)

Trans
(Eff)

21
(43)

30
(100)

8
(71)

26
(100)

20
(95)

14.5
(57)

25.3
(98.3)

21.0
(81.7)

3(Y)

4(X)

5(Y)

6(Y)

7(X)

8(Y)

9(X)

10(Y)

Avg.(X)

Avg.(Y)

Avg.
(All)

9
(74)

32
(100)

6
(80)

6
(80)

27
(99)

6
(81)

17
(97)

6
(81)

25.3
(99)

6.6
(79.2)

13.6
(86.5)

Avg. 6
Inf.
Traders

17.4
(89.5)
Trans
(Eff)

Trans
(Eff)

9
(75)

33
(100)

6
(80)

6
(80)

28
(100)

6
(80)

25
(100)

6
(81)

5(Y)

6(X)

7(Y)

8(Y)

9(X)

10(Y)

11(X)

12(Y)

7
(79)

32
(100)

6
(80)

6
(81)

27
(99)

6
(80)

23
(96)

6
(81)

25.0
(100)

12.8
(79.2)

17.4
(87.0)

13(X)

Avg.(X)

Avg.(Y)

Avg.
(All)

22
(96)

26.0
(97.8)

6.2
(80.2)

14.8
(88.0)

Avg. 6
Inf.
Traders

18.0
(94.1)
Trans
(Eff)

8
(78)

32
(100)

6
(80)

6
(81)

26
(100)

b

6
(81)

25
(100)

6
(80)

25
(100)

27.0
(100)

6.4
(80.0)

15.4
(88.9)

Table 3 shows the number of transactions and efficiency levels for simulated algorithmic traders who use a simple linear heuristic to
update aspiration levels. We conducted a sensitivity analysis to show how reducing the number of informed traders affects market
outcomes with both 5000 iterations and 10000 iterations. The final column shows the average of all sessions for the corresponding
simulations with six informed traders from Table 2.
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Figure 1
Time Chart of Prices in a 2 State Market Versus Human Trader Data from Market 2 of Plott & Sunder (1982)
Caption: Figure 1 shows the price paths in Market 2 of Plott and Sunder (1982) for periods where participants have different information (heavy blue line for
mean price in markets with human traders; medium red line for median of 50 replications of simulated markets with algorithmic traders). Each black dot in the
“cloud” is an observed transaction price in the simulated markets plotted by transaction sequence number. The green straight line and the brown broken line
depict the rational expectation (RE) and prior information (PI) predicted equilibrium prices for the respective periods (the two prices are identical under State Y).
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Figure 2
Time Chart of Prices in a 2 State Market Versus Human Trader Data from Market 3 of Plott & Sunder (1982)
Caption: Figure 2 shows the price paths in Market 3 of Plott and Sunder (1982) for periods where participants have different information (heavy blue line for
mean price in markets with human traders; medium red line for median of 50 replications of simulated markets with algorithmic traders). Each black dot in the
“cloud” is an observed transaction price in the simulated markets plotted by transaction sequence number. The green straight line and the brown broken line
depict the rational expectation (RE) and prior information (PI) predicted equilibrium prices for the respective periods (the two prices are identical under State Y).
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Figure 3
Time Chart of Prices in a 2 State Market Versus Human Trader Data from Market 4 of Plott & Sunder (1982)
Caption: Figure 3 shows the price paths in Market 4 of Plott and Sunder (1982) for periods where participants have different information (heavy blue line for
mean price in markets with human traders; medium red line for median of 50 replications of simulated markets with algorithmic traders). Each black dot in the
“cloud” is an observed transaction price in the simulated markets plotted by transaction sequence number. The green straight line and the brown broken line
depict the rational expectation (RE) and prior information (PI) predicted equilibrium prices for the respective periods (the two prices are identical under State Y).

27

Figure 4
Time Chart of Prices in a 3 State Market Versus Human Trader Data from Market 5 of Plott & Sunder (1982)
Caption: Figure 4 shows the price paths in Market 5 of Plott and Sunder (1982) for periods where participants have different information (heavy blue line for
mean price in markets with human traders; medium red line for median of 50 replications of simulated markets with algorithmic traders). Each black dot in the
“cloud” is an observed transaction price in the simulated markets plotted by transaction sequence number. The green straight line and the brown broken line
depict the rational expectation (RE) and prior information (PI) predicted equilibrium prices for the respective periods (the two prices are identical under States Y
and Z).
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Figure 5
Mean Squared Deviation of Observed Prices from RE Equilibrium Prices
Caption: Figure 5 charts the progression of mean squared deviation of observed prices from RE equilibrium prices with respect to transaction sequence numbers
(heavy blue line for price in markets with human traders; medium red line for algorithmic traders). In human Market 4, the first five root mean squared deviations
exceed 0.02 (for a maximum of 0.145 for transaction 3), and are out-of-scale chosen for the y-axis. Ordinary Least Squares regression (MSD = α + β log
Transaction No.) estimates of β, p-value and R2 for human and algorithmic markets are shown numerically in boxes inside each chart (e.g., in market 5: β = 0.00082, p-value = 0.001 and R2 = 0.90 for human markets).
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Figure 6
Average Number of Transactions for Algorithm Traders vs. Human Traders of Plott & Sunder (1982)
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Figure 7: Average Efficiency of Algorithm Traders vs. Human Traders of Plott & Sunder (1982)
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Figure 8: Average Efficiency of Transactions for Algorithm Traders by the number of informed traders
in each market for high and low equilibrium price states.
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